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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ABRAHAM MARIO SHAFFER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040274-CA 
Appellant is incarcerated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. SHAFFER'S COUNSEL DID NOT INVITE ERROR REGARDING 
SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS 
The State's first argument against granting Mr. Shaffer relief in this case is that 
counsel for Mr. Shaffer invited the error. In order for invited error to apply, there must 
have been "affirmative representations that can properly be characterized as leading the 
court into error." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ^ 18, 164 P.3d 366. Invited error is 
distinct from a failure to object in that it requires an active agreement with the erroneous 
statement or conduct. See also, Tshaggenv v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, ^ [ 13, 163 
P.3d 615 (finding that where counsel "clearly communicated his argument" he had 
invited error); In re. Adoption of B.O., 972 P.2d 202, 205 (UT App 1996) (holding that 
counsel invited error when he "wholeheartedly supported] the application of a given 
statute"). "Invited error generally occurs in a more affirmative manner, such as where 
counsel stipulates to the court's instruction, states directly that there is no objection to a 
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specific ruling of the court, or provides the court with erroneous authority upon which the 
court relies." Pratt, 2007 UT 41, Tf 23. The doctrine of invited error does not prevent the 
court from granting relief in this case because counsel for Mr. Shaffer did not make an 
affirmative representation that can properly be characterized as leading the court into 
error. 
The state argues that statements made by Mr. Shaffer's counsel during sentencing 
affirmatively represented to the court that the sentencing recommendation of one year in 
jail in addition to the time the defendant had already served, followed by probation, was 
the agreed upon sentencing recommendation. Counsel stated: 
"[A]t the time of our sentencing in this matter, there was a 
negotiated settlement of the charges and as a part of those 
negotiations, the State agreed to recommend a year in jail 
beyond the time that the defendant had already served and at 
the conclusion of that year, they would recommend he be 
placed on probation. 
And I'm asking the Court this morning to follow the 
State's recommendation, which I believe the State will be 
renewing later and which time--the State agreed to at the time 
that the pleas were taken-that the plea was taken." 
R.132:4. 
Later in her sentencing argument, counsel stated: "I think looking at the way that 
the co-perpetrators were handled, the resolution that was endorsed by Ms. Johnson on 
behalf of the District Attorney's Office makes sense." R.132:l 1. The overall context of 
counsel's statements, especially the second statement, indicates that counsel's position 
was that the prosecutor's recommendation would conform to the recommendation 
promised in the plea agreement. Counsel's second statement recommending "the 
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resolution that was endorsed . . . on behalf of the District Attorney's Office," clearly 
references the plea agreement. Because it references and advocates the sentencing 
recommendation in the plea agreement, it is not an affirmative representation to the court 
that counsel agreed that the sentencing recommendation from the state should be one year 
in jail in addition to the time served rather than two years in jail with credit for time 
served as set out in the plea agreement. Rather, it is an endorsement of the 
recommendation required by the plea agreement. Counsel's statements ultimately 
advocated the recommendation agreed on in the plea agreement. Because counsel did not 
affirmatively represent that her recommendation was for a year of jail time in addition to 
the time already served, her statements did not invite error. 
II. THE PROSECUTOR BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT. THE 
BREACH WAS PLAIN ERROR AND TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 
OBJECT TO THE STATE'S BREACH WAS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
If a prosecutor breaches a plea agreement, error exists. Santobello v. New York, 
404 U.S. 257, 259 (1971). "fIn determining whether the terms of a plea agreement have 
been violated, the court must determine whether the government's conduct is inconsistent 
with what was reasonably understood by the defendant when entering the plea of guilty.m 
United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 939 (3rd Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. 
Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1988)). A plea agreement is a contract, 
although "the government cannot resort to a rigidly literal approach in the construction of 
language." Id. 
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In the plea agreement that the state made with Mr. Shaffer, the state explicitly 
agreed to recommend two years in jail with credit for time served and a suspended prison 
sentence, not to pursue gun or gang enhancements, and to join in a motion to reduce the 
degree of the conviction upon Mr. Shaffer's successful completion of probation. R. 99. 
When it made these promises to Mr. Shaffer in the plea agreement, the state implicitly 
agreed not to take actions that would suggest that Mr. Shaffer's punishment should be 
more severe that what the state recommended! See State v. Xaviar, 69 P.3d 901, 903-04 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement when the 
prosecutor recommended the sentence as promised but "proceeded to . . . highlight... 
circumstances that would support an exceptional sentence," effectively undercutting the 
plea agreement). In making a different sentencing recommendation than what was 
agreed on, R. 132:13, failing to convey it's agreed upon sentencing recommendation to 
Adult Probation and Parole, R. 134 Adult Probation and Parole Report, requesting gang 
conditions, R. 132: 13, expressing concerns about Mr. Shaffer's family that suggested Mr. 
Shaffer would not be a good candidate for parole, R. 132:13-14, and presenting the 
victim's opinion that Mr. Shaffer should be incarcerated as long as possible, R. 132:14, 
the prosecutor breached the express and implied promises in the plea agreement. Trial 
counsel made no objections to these breaches of the plea agreement by the state. R. 
132:12-16. 
The state did not adhere to the terms of its plea agreement with Mr. Shaffer; 
therefore, error exists. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 259. Because the court was aware of the 
plea agreement, and the law making the breach of the agreement error was in effect when 
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Mr. Shaffer was sentenced, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. There 
was no strategic reason for trial counsel's failure to object to the error and competent 
counsel would have objected; therefore, trial counsel's actions were objectively deficient. 
See Santobello, 404 U.S. 257. If Mr. Shaffer had known that following his entry of a 
guilty plea the state would recommend a longer sentence than agreed upon and make 
statements to the court that suggested that he needed to be incarcerated for longer than 
the state agreed to recommend, he would not have plead guilty. Additionally, had it not 
been for the prosecutor's breaches of the plea agreement, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that Mr. Shaffer would have received a more favorable sentence. Because Mr. Shaffer 
would not have plead guilty had he known he would not get the benefit of his bargain and 
because it is reasonably likely that he would have received a more favorable sentence but 
for the prosecutors' beaches of the agreement, the error was harmful under the plain error 
test and prejudicial under the ineffective assistance of counsel test. 
A. THE PROSECUTOR BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
1. The Prosecutor's Sentencing Recommendation 
First, the state argues that the prosecutor's change of sentencing recommendation 
was not error because it was only a technical change rather than a material breach. Br. 
Appellee at 20 n.6. The state relies on generally accepted theories of contract 
interpretation in arguing that the prosecutor's deviation from the plea agreement was not a 
breach because it was not material. Br. Appellee at 20 n.6. However, "there are limits to 
the contract analogy, and . . . contract principles 'cannot be blindly incorporated into the 
criminal law in the area of plea bargaining.'" State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 387 (Utah 
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1997) (quoting United States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1980). Additionally, 
the case cited by the state, State v. Bowers, 696 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Wis. App. 2005), 
reached the conclusion that a defendant is entitled to relief only where the breach 
"deprives the defendant of a material and substantial benefit for which he or she 
bargained." The court reached this conclusion based on a fact pattern with important 
differences from the instant case. In Bowers, the prosecutor realized that the 
recommendation made was not that which was agreed upon and promptly corrected it. 
696 N.W.2d at 260. The most significant fact relied on by the court in Bowers was the 
prosecutor's immediate correction of the mistake and recommendation of the agreed upon 
sentence. IcL In Mr. Shaffer's case, no such correction occurred. R. 132:13-15. Because 
the facts of this case differ significantly from the facts in Bowers, that court's conclusions 
should not apply here. 
Furthermore, the state argues that the prosecutor's failure to make the 
recommendation agreed to in the plea agreement was not a breach of the plea agreement 
because the sentence actually recommend would have only been approximately thirty 
days longer than what the prosecutor had agreed to recommend in the plea agreement and 
the two sentences were "functionally equivalent." Br. Appellee at 21. The state is 
required to "adhere strictly to the terms of the bargain it strikes with defendants." United 
States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273, 1274 (3rd Cir. 1977). In the plea agreement context, the 
government may be held to a higher standard of performance than the defendant. State v. 
Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 387 (Utah 1997). A sentence recommendation for a sentence that 
was approximately thirty days longer than what was in the plea agreement was not what 
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Mr. Shaffer bargained for when he signed the plea agreement with the state. R.95-100. 
Also, the prosecutor further departed from the plea agreement when she stated that 
defendant's behavior "warrants, at minimum, another year in jail." R.132:14 (emphasis 
added). The benefit Mr. Shaffer expected to receive in exchange for his guilty plea was 
not that the state would recommend a minimum of another year in jail, it was that the 
state would specifically recommend a two year jail sentence with credit for time served. 
Because the state is required to strictly adhere to the terms of the plea agreement 
and it did not, the prosecutor's breaches of the plea agreement were error. 
2. The Prosecutor's Failure to Convey the Agreed Upon Sentencing Recommendation 
The state next argues that Mr. Shaffer has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor 
breached the plea agreement by failing to convey the agreed upon sentencing 
recommendations to Adult Probation and Pairole (AP&P). The absence of any mention 
in the AP&P report of a sentencing recommendation by the prosecution, however, is 
adequate to prove that the prosecutor did not recommend a two year jail sentence with 
credit for time served, as required by the plea agreement. Under the heading "A. PLEA 
AGREEMENT," the report states only that "[t]he defendant plead guilty as charged to 
Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony." R.134: AP&P Presentence Report p. 3. 
Had the prosecutor made the recommendations as required, those recommendations 
would have logically been included in that section of the report. Because the prosecutor 
must strictly adhere to the plea agreement, the prosecutor's failure to convey the agreed 
on recommendation to AP&P was a breach of the agreement. That breach was error. 
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The state also suggests thai Mi, Shaffer hould have requested a 23B hearing to 
develop evidence regarding whether the prosecutor conveyed the agreed upon 
r it a tinm e n d a11 o 11 to AP&P because that evidence won 1 d K i e q u 11 • • d » J > < 1 etermine whether 
trial counsel was ineffective in Jailing to obju.i lo ihr APAfcP report, The • Miiissio-i -^ f inv 
discussion >M tnc /^.m^ * • * • ^ commendation by the prosecution m t:x ... iJ 
repv;s . M;U,IU unds for a finding of ineffective assistance ! | ivsetho 
l.ii'k ofmiy discussion of the recommendation woiil-l pivmpl competent counsel to object 
basedonitsa.bsen.ee, TIOWUNU, ifihi num agrees with the state that more evidence 
woulu be iequiii'-1 determine if counsel was ineffective, it should remand '"«" • hearing 
iuestion under Utah Rule of Appeiiaic I'i-oecchiiv J.^ H, * M;ili R App P 23R(a) 
("Nothing in this rule shall pruJnlnl ihe rum I (mm remanding the case under this rule on 
its own motion al mi) < mie if the claim has been raised and the motion would Ii«i\ c been 
a\ail,ihl-' lo a narlv.Mi 
3, The Prosecutor's Recommendation 01 vian^ conui'w. ^ 
The state argues (h.il ils rrquest for gang conditions at sentencing did not hie.H I« 
me plea agreement made by the prosecutor not to seek gang enhancement. 
"In evaluating compliance with pka baiguni • "iln; government cannot resort to a 







 uu)a;'' (citing United Slates v. Crusco, ^ 
m determining whether the terms of a ,iica ug:^. i • .•*• violated, {the] court 
must determine whether the governmem's conduct is inconsistent with what was 
reasonabl) uudersl*HKI l» (lie defendant when entering the plea oi
 rum;> 
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at 939 (quoting United States v. Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
"Even an oblique variance will entitle the defendant to a remedy if it 'taints' the 
sentencing hearing by implying to the Court that the defendant deserves more punishment 
than was bargained for." State v. Bowers, 696 N.W. 2d 255,259 (Wis. App. 2005). Most 
importantly to this case, "[a] breach of a plea agreement occurs not only when the 
prosecution breaks its promise, but also when the spirit of the inducement is breached." 
State v. Sodders, 633 P.2d 432, 438 (Ariz. 1981). 
The state's argument that its request for gang conditions did not breach its 
agreement not to seek gang enhancements is precisely the type of literal approach to the 
construction of plea agreement language that courts have previously found to be a breach. 
In State v. Blackwell 522 S.E.2d 313,315 (N.C. App. 1999), the state agreed not to use 
the charge of felonious impaired driving, which the defendant plead guilty to, as a basis 
for first degree murder under the felony murder rule. Id In attempting to prove the 
felony murder charge, the state asserted that defendant committed the felony of assault 
with a deadly weapon because of his culpable negligence in operating his vehicle. Id, To 
support its culpable negligence theory, the state introduced evidence of defendant's guilty 
plea to felonious impaired driving. Id. The court held that the state's use of defendant's 
guilty plea to felonious impaired driving to prove culpable negligence breached the plea 
agreement even though the state did not actually attempt to use the guilty plea as a basis 
for felony murder. Id In response to the state's argument that the defendant could have 
foreseen the state's parsing of the plea agreement and bargained for protection from such 
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use ofthe plea, the court stated ti:...- ' ^fendant should not be forced to anticipate 
loopholes that the si.ac M .j.. i • • • ;n its own promises." TdL 
1 -• *'"-jii between gang enhancements and gaii* . * -i.-' i"oils that the state 
attempts to draw in this case is analogous - ^ Mo's attempt to use the defendant's 
guilty plea to felonious impaired driving in BlackweiL in Blackvviii. wnae the >IJH 
pronn.Wv; e defendant's guilu plea to leU-mo.. ••: . ' i! h|1]he 
defendant quite reasonably interpreted mi:,: . . . .u .e stale vvould not use the 
felonious impaired driving [pica; <• •. -hape, or form-directly or denvalh eh, U\ 
prove felony muuk (,"" miliar expectation arose from., the elcniinl ^I'thc plea 
agree merit in this case where the state agreed not to puisne gang enhancements. This 
agreement is quite reasonably inlerpivied :i\ prohibiting the state from directly pursuing 
gang enhancements or indirectly advocating for a. lengthier sentence -h-..- cing Mr. 
Shaffer^ alleged gang connections. Because a prosecutor may not do indirectly what she 
has agreed nut in do directly. State v. ircigu^on, Mv N. W.2d at 243, the request for gang 
conditions breached u:-_ ;• ... ».-R - ;-V:M, ibis prosecutorial breach ot the pic-.i a-^  ^ nent 
was error. Sic sanU'iXM» \ •• l ^ at ~^" 
•I. Concerns About Defendant's l;amii\ anu Presentation of Victim's Statements. 
Finally, the state argues thai ihe prosecutor's expression of concern, ar-. 
trustworthlni'.V'. am! support of Mr. Shailer's family and he. pi', .v.. . - ! "he victim's 
statements were not breaches of the plea agre-:. . • - » 'K% plea agreement did not 
preclude the prosecutor from recoiiim.end.ing certain conditions of probation and. heuiuse 
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the prosecutor had a duty to "assist victims in exercising their right to be heard at 
important criminal justice hearings." Br. Appellee p. 29-33. 
Both of these statements by the prosecutor constituted an attempt to do indirectly 
what the state promised not to do directly, namely, recommending a sentence longer than 
two years with credit for time served. See State v. Furguson, 479 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1991) (stating "Santobello proscribes not only explicit repudiation of plea 
agreements, but also fend-runs around them1"; and "[t]he state may not accomplish 
'through indirect means what it promised not to do directly,' i.e., convey a message to the 
trial court that a defendant's actions warrant a more severe sentence than that 
recommended"). 
The prosecutor's statements about Mr. Shaffer's family, in particular when she 
stated, "I think his family support doesn't necessarily give me any reassurances that he's 
going to behave," conveyed the message that even though probation was being 
recommended, the state believed that it was not appropriate and Mr. Shaffer should be 
incarcerated instead. Her statement that the victim felt that Mr. Shaffer should be 
incarcerated as long as possible carried a similar message. This undermining of the 
agreed on recommendation was a breach of the plea agreement. See State v. Xaviar, 69 
P.3d 901, 904 (Wash. App. 2003) (holding that the prosecutor breached the plea 
agreement where remarks made by the prosecutor "signaled to the court her lack of 
support for a standard range sentence and thereby 'effectively undercut the plea 
agreement in a transparent attempt to sustain an exceptional sentence'") (quoting State v. 
Jerde, 93 Wash.App 774, 782, 970 P.2d 781)). 
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In regard to the victim's .slalenienls, tin/ state argues that the prosecutor had • , . 
to introduce the victim's desire that "the defendant should be incarcerated • • i ,\s 
possible iinclt.i" the Victims' Rights Act, I Jtah Code A,:. . * *h -5, ai.J „.=. 
Uifthts of Crime Victim's Act, Utah U ^ • " ' • hrouL'i- * R.132:14. 
'•
 ;i, ough both ol . . ,,tL ,i\ • • o SUM ? Give crime victims the right to DL , •. /ni 
mi. . . i; ~H in certain proceedings. ihe\ do ,,*>i ;r;. fo express 
iinoii regarding the character-•, liic .:::«.-• ropriate sentence. See State 
v. Pit. 2010 ITT 1 ,^|..: "i ,, • -- • ri i * holding that victim impact eviueiw 
"featured tlic •< id unsi' i trillion of the defendant's character or the appro]' \\ o- •- c 
w en * 'Vlearlv at odds with United States Supreme :> • ' jL^uuse this type 
of victim impact evidence is not all* >\\ cd i he prosecutor was not obligated to present it. 
Her presentation ol ihis evidence undermined the agreed on sentencing reiommendiition 
*- iiu^retbre a breach of the plea agreement. 
The prosecutor's Vc , i, i .:.. ; , . .:ee>' "f ' introducing statements that 
suggested Mr. Shall'. * f^ ood candidate- for probation and by inlmdnv "i>f 
statement Ih •' (he victim thought the longest possible period oi inemveration was an 
apn-onriate sentence were error, state v. Fergus •.. '*) N. W.2d at 243. 
A IHF 'NA i h C S BKhAUi Ol- 1 HI: P! FA AGREEMENT WAM-JL/UN 
l-RROK i \l COFNSFF'S FA1FURF TO OBJECT TO THE BREACH V7 AS 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCF o r rOTlNSEL 
1. Main Error 
Plain error is committed .! error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to iIn; M'MI i-nun and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the enoi, thc*\- u n 
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reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant.t! State v. Dean, 
2004 UT 63, Tf 13, 95 P.3d 276. A prosecutors breach of a plea agreement is error. 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1971). An error is obvious to the trial 
court if the law regarding the error is clear at the time of trial. State v. Beck, 2006 UT 
App 177, *|j 9, 136 P.3d 1288. In cases of prosecutorial breach of a plea agreement, the 
error of breach is harmful if "but for the plea agreement, which was rendered meaningless 
by the State's breach and the trial court's failure to hold the State to its bargain, 
[defendant] would not have admitted the allegations against him." State v. Hale, No. 
20040336-CA, 2005 UT App 305, *1, 2005 WL 1530526 (citing State v. Dean, 2004 UT 
62, If 22). 
The state cites the case of Puckett v. United States for the proposition that in order 
to satisfy the harmfulness prong of the plain error test, the defendant must show that 
"[wjhen the rights acquired by the defendant relate to sentencing, the "outcome" he must 
show to have been affected is his sentence." 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433 n.4 (2009). Although 
Puckett focused on plain error review, it involved an interpretation of Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 52(b), therefore, it does not control the analysis of whether there was 
plain error under Utah law. See State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 74, ^  18 n.2, 123 P.3d 432 
(stating that analysis of plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) 
differs from the plain error analysis under Utah law); Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 
(Utah 1984) (holding that although Utah law and federal law incorporated the same 
principles, a different result may be reached under Utah law than under federal law). 
Puckett also involved a situation where although the government agreed to request a 
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sentencing guideline rcducuon \• s : - ! •.'.. s ..Responsibility, defendant commiit •: 
new offense beiore . . C U - M . , , indicating that he had not taken responsih* * • « 5 s 
crimin-il -MMS and making i< highlv unlikeK tiut iii^ courl would i»i:ti it a reduction if one 
was requested. 129 S.Ct, at 14,Ki. hinhcrnioie, own if the outcome that must be 
affected by the error is lk» Miiknie, Mr. Shaffer only needs to show jh_ . . 
for the uiif 'i. <i reasonable likelihood existed that there won'..; • •, • - nore favorable 
result for him. Stale v. Mitchell 7 , , ..* -M ;^So>. When the record 
does not reflect that u .^ ..oJei. • -^ -.'d die bcnciit contemplated by the plea 
agreement ui lluf '»>• o «»nlti likrly not have obtained the benetn ; ^;o wmclude 
that "ihe defendant has shown a 'reasonable pu,:••,«• that but for the error he would 
have received a more favorable sem • , mied States v. Dawson, 587 F.3d <>-in wi '* 
(4th Cir. 2009). I luil o; the rase here. 
The prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement * lailnin to make the required 
sentencing recommendation to the , v *\vi P. and by undermining the agreed on 
sentencing recommendation by reqi testing gang conditions, negnti\ co j * i L •. ' 
Shaffer's famil\ airport for probation, and introduce.. , - guarding 
sentencing was error, See Supra , Santopc:. . ,.Ne\v_York n^ l ' . \ Jw:. .o . 
H ^ r Thr • ;. *: .« ^ olca -Agreement was error was established law ,il llh: 
unit *-.•*• * vxns sentenced. See Id. Additional^, i;.. • - wio- aware of the plea 
agreement and the agreement regardm ecommendations in 
particular, R.121:4-5, therefore, the error should have been obvious to the court, I1 mally, 
had it not been U H1 ihe Kf;itt'\ inducement of agreeing to recommend a loo -, ear sentence 
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with credit for time served, Mr. Shaffer would not have plead guilty. Mr. Shaffer relied 
on the statefs assurance that the prosecutor would make a particular sentencing 
recommendation in order to persuade the court to give him a more favorable sentence. 
Because he would not have plead guilty but for the breached plea agreement, Mr. Shaffer 
was harmed by the state's breach and is entitled to a remedy. State v. Hale, No. 
20040336-CA, 2005 UT App 305, *1, 2005 WL 1530526; Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263. 
Also, the record in this case indicates that Mr. Shaffer did not receive a benefit 
from his bargain with the state. R. 113. On the record before this court, it is not clear 
that he would not have received the benefit of a more favorable sentence had it not been 
for the prosecutor's breach. In contrast to the defendant in Puckett, there was no act by 
Mr. Shaffer that would have made it as highly unlikely that the court would not take the 
prosecutor's sentencing recommendations into account. R.132. The prosecutor's breach 
seriously undermined her agreement to recommend a particular sentence and conveyed a 
contrary message to the court. The record contains two presentence reports, one from 
AP&P and one from Judicial Supervision Services (JSS). See R.107, 134 Judicial 
Supervision Services Report Feb. 18, 2009, Judicial Supervision Services Report 
Addendum March 6, 2009, and Adult Probation and Parole Report. The prosecutor failed 
to convey the agreed on sentencing recommendation, therefore the AP&P report was not 
as favorable to Mr. Shaffer as it would have been without the breach. The 
recommendation made by AP&P was also not the consensus recommendation of all the 
agencies that evaluated Mr. Shaffer. In contrast to the AP&P report, the JSS report 
recommended that Mr. Mr. Shaffer remain in jail for an additional three to six months 
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followed by supervised probation. JSS Rcpur Addendum, p. 1. The record also 
contained a letter L Shaffer expressing remorse and stating his coiimiilmnil U« 
ciiiuiL;-'.!.- ,: riii in lite, R. lOS-112. and c'M-ii|Mimenia;; IU.TS |mm Mr. Shaffer's pastor 
and his former employers, R, 134. I lad ilic prosecutor not breached the plea agreement 
by 1.) recommendiiu a A IUU* • <  ^ s d>nn agreed upon and by suggesting the Mi , 
Shatter ;>h« mid lv mrarcerated for longer than she recommends *. *hdi mi. 
Shaffer deserved "at a minimum," an additional year <>f incarceration, R. 132:14; 2.) 
failing to convey the agreed t . . . recommendation to AP&P: T) undermining 
her recommn-i : nesting gang conditions in an end-run around her agreement 
t Ut seek cane, enhancements, K. ul i >. an* • ininjj her recommendation by 
stating that his family support dm n« — • - -.T tliat he would "behave" on probation 
and by improperly providing the victim's opinion regarding sentencing, there i:> *.i 
lvasniikihk livelihood that her recommendation as requa- • ' • agreement coupled 
with the other evidence favorabk ; .. • ia. • ;' vcord would have resulted m a 
more favorable sentence. 
- iiieik-tuvc XsMstance of Counsel... 
Counsel is ineffective if counsel's actuals ^ er i ^hiectively deficient and if those 
deficient actions prcj.,•.•;•. - ••'••• State v. Tempi x l ^ i' id is.. ns". mad 
1990,1' 1111<IJ• • (li ill l;»n prejudice will be found when, iuui .. ..,••• • L- n • • *, a 
reasonable likelihood existed that there would hu , M >I more favorable result for the 
defendant. State v. Mucin.. , ! t Utah 1989). Where counsel fails to 
objecttoaproseeuhnV, hu'ikh of a plea agreement, "[d]efendant |i>| , . . p>- :[Lckni hv 
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the error because . . . but for the plea agreement, which was rendered meaningless by the 
State's breach and the trial court's failure to hold the State to its bargain, he would not 
have admitted the allegations against him." State v. Hale, No. 20040336, 2005 UT App 
305, *1, 2005 WL 1530526. The plain error harmflilness test and the ineffective 
assistance of counsel prejudice test require essentially the same showing." State v. Dean, 
2004 UT 63, % 22; See also, Templin, 805 P.2d at 187 (holding that in order to show 
prejudice resulting from counsel's error, defendant "must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different"). 
The state first argues that trial counsel's conduct was not ineffective because there 
is a plausible strategic explanation for trial counsel's failure to object to the state's 
sentencing recommendation. Br. Appellee at p. 23-24. Specifically, the state argues that 
counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's breaches could be explained by the fact that 
counsel realized that the trial court did not have the power to impose a two-year sentence 
as a condition of probation. Br. Appellee at 23-24. The state, however, bears "the risk of 
the mistake as to the law in effect at the time the parties entered into the plea agreement." 
See State v. Patience, 944 P.2d at 388. The state of the law would not have prevented the 
prosecutor from making the recommendation as agreed in the plea agreement, therefore, 
the state's argument does not provide a plausible strategic explanation for trial counsel's 
failure to object. The state's argument regarding a plausible strategic explanation for trial 
counsel's error also fails to address the prosecutor's breach in recommending a minimum 
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of an additional year in jaii, LLUO.. • .^cslingthatMr. Shaffer should receive a greater 
jail sentence than :.[.. .• ^ ..:.--.c; o recommend. 
Allowing the prosecutor lo make a recommends;< = -: .'ontr-^y to the pica 
agreement clearly fell below an objective standai "1 of reasonableness given the state of 
the law regarding breaches < A plea agreements. See SantobelKx *1'*4 1 -2 
(holding that where a prosecutor breaches a plea agreement th*. • " • - entitled .o a 
remedy). Additionally, there is no plausible strategic explanation for trial counsel's 
failure to object the prosecutors i tr'MnineiHlation that Mr. Shaffer serve a miniiiitnn ul 
one additional yeai in MI I I lie state agreed to recommend a specih .v uwii the 
piweeulitr recommended a iail term of one year as >. M » of what Mr. Shaffer 
deserved, she breached the plea ug»\, ' !'^rv such a clear breach of the agreement 
exists, ellective t«tmisd w ould have made an objection. See U.S. v. Strickland, ^»n 1 I.S. 
"
 v
 ' • * ^ " •s^rn-jp.. .jciense counsel's duty to provide effedn v assistance and to 
"advocate the defendant's cause"). 
Trial counsel's huluiv lo ohjrcl to die AP&P report because it did noi 
vv., .a •*•••- -.-'•« a* recommendation had been conveyed by the prosecu^r vvas also 
obiecli\ely deficient < ii\en that any meuljoji ni (In11 agreed upon sentencing 







 P'^aagreement terms. See MncKianu * v\ asking (an *o6 
I • >68, 688 ^1984) (stating that counsel "has a diny tu hung to bear such skill and 
knowledge a* will rcnu. * .... . le adversarial testing process"). Such an 
objection %A*. . ,u ... * . ? . ecssary to ensure that the prosecutor kepi fita pi'Minise 
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Counsel should have acted to ensure that any favorable recommendation by the state was 
considered by AP&P. Additionally, given the state of the law regarding breaches of plea 
agreements, when faced with evidence that agreed-upon sentencing recommendations 
were not made, counsel should have objected in order to obtain a remedy for Mr. Shaffer 
if there was a breach of the agreement. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (stating that a 
breach of a plea agreement warranted a remedy in the "interests of justice and [the] 
appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to the promises made 
in the negotiation of pleas"). No plausible strategic reasons exist for counsel's failure to 
ensure that favorable information that the prosecution promised to provide was given to 
AP&P. 
Finally, there was no plausible strategic reason for trial counsel's failure to object 
to 1.) statements that indirectly suggested that Mr. Shaffer should be incarcerated for a 
longer period of time because of gang involvement when the prosecutor directly agreed 
in the plea agreement not to seek gang enhancements; R. 99, 132: 13, 2.) statements 
suggesting that Mr. Shaffer should not receive probation as recommended and should be 
incarcerated for a longer period of time that undermined the agreed on sentencing 
recommendation; R. 132:13-14, and 3.) statements conveying the victim's opinion 
regarding the proper sentence that undermined the agreed on sentencing 
recommendation. Competent counsel would have objected to the prosecutor's attempt to 
do indirectly what she had agreed directly not to do. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 
(describing defense counsel's duty to "bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will 
render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process"). There is no conceivable reason to 
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forego an objection when established law provides a remedy for a prosecutor's breach of 
the plea agreement. See Santobello. 404 U.S. 257; State v. Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *2 
(unpublished) (recognizing that a defendant is entitled to a remedy for a prosecutor's 
breach). 
Counsel's ineffective actions prejudiced Mr. Shaffer. First, had defense counsel 
promptly objected to any of the prosecution's breaches, Mr. Shaffer would have been 
entitled to a remedy. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263; Br. Appellant at 22. Additionally, 
because Mr. Shaffer would not have plead guilty absent the inducements in the plea 
agreement, which were rendered meaningless by the prosecution's breach, the error was 
prejudicial. Hale, 2005 UT App 305, *1 (unpublished) (acknowledging that when the 
prosecutor's promise was rendered meaningless, and defendant would not have admitted 
the allegations but for the promise, defendant was prejudiced). If trial counsel had 
properly objected and held the prosecutor to her promise, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that that Mr. Shaffer would have received a more favorable sentence. See Supra, B. 2; 
Br. Appellant at p. 23. Because Mr. Shaffer would have likely received a more favorable 
sentence if counsel had objected to the prosecutor's breaches and demanded adherence to 
the plea agreement, he was prejudiced. State v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah 
1989). 
Finally, because of trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's breaches, Mr. 
Shaffer has been forced to argue plain error when he would have had an automatic 
remedy if the objections were properly made. See Br. Appellant C.(l). This court should 
address the case on its merits and find that Mr. Shaffer is entitled to a remedy. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above arguments, Mr. Shaffer respectfully request that this court 
vacate his sentence and remand for sentencing before a new judge, withdrawal of the 
plea, or any other proper remedy. 
SUBMITTED this ffi day of February, 2010. 
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